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Abstract
Certificate transparency (CT) is an elegant mecha-
nism designed to detect when a certificate authority
(CA) has issued a certificate incorrectly. Many CAs
now support CT and it is being actively deployed in
browsers. However, a number of privacy-related chal-
lenges remain. In this paper we propose practical so-
lutions to two issues. First, we develop a mechanism
that enables web browsers to audit a CT log with-
out violating user privacy. Second, we extend CT to
support non-public subdomains.
1 Introduction
There are many documented cases in which Certifi-
cate Authorities (CAs) have issued certificates incor-
rectly. While DigiNotar and Comodo are among the
most well publicized examples [2, 33], misissuance
happens several times a year [51] and can enable ac-
tive man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on a large
population of users. For example, misissuance of an
example.com certificate can lead to an MITM on all
example.com traffic, unless defenses are deployed.
In response, several defenses have been pro-
posed [16], such as key pinning [22, 34, 20, 29, 3],
DANE [26], Perspectives [50], country-specific re-
strictions [27] and others. Certificate Transparency
(CT) [31] provides an elegant defense that is being
actively deployed by web browser vendors and CAs.
A brief overview of CT
The goal of Certificate Transparency is to make all
issued certificates publicly visible. By inspecting the
set of issued certificates, domain owners can identify a
certificate issued for their domain without permission
and ensure that it is revoked. To accomplish this,
CT uses a set of public, untrusted, append-only log
servers that track and publish all certificates issued
by CAs. Eventually, major browsers will only trust
a certificate if it comes with a proof that it has been
recorded in a public log. A certificate without such a
proof will be treated as invalid. This will effectively
force all CAs to register every issued certificate with
one or more CT logs.
Once CT is enforced by browsers, a rogue certifi-
cate for example.com that is used in an attack must
appear on one of the public logs. This enables ad-
ministrators at example.com, or an agent monitoring
the logs on their behalf, to detect the rogue certifi-
cate and revoke it. CT makes it possible to detect
misissuance. The task of investigating and possibly
penalizing negligent CAs is handled outside of the
protocol.
To explain our work, we must first briefly review
how CT works. CT adds an additional step to certifi-
cate issuance. When a CA wishes to issue a certificate
for, say, example.com, it chooses a public CT log and
sends the certificate data, called a precertificate, to
the log. The log uses a secret signing key to generate
a Signed Certificate Timestamp, or SCT, which acts
as a promise that the log will add the certificate to
its public log within a specified period of time, called
the maximum merge delay (MMD, usually 24 hours).
This SCT is sent back to the CA, and the CA typ-
ically embeds it in the final signed certificate as an
X.509 extension.
Two types of entities ensure that CAs and log
servers properly follow CT procedures:
• Monitors check for suspicious certificates in
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logs by downloading and reviewing all log en-
tries.
• Auditors verify that logs are behaving correctly
based on their partial views of logs and check
that SCTs they encounter appear in logs.
Note that auditors can produce irrefutable crypto-
graphic evidence of misbehavior by logs (such as at-
tempting to delete log entries after inserting them),
whereas monitors search for examples of misissued
certificates which cannot be conclusively proven to
indicate misbehaviour. It is assumed that large or-
ganizations such as web hosting providers, content-
delivery networks or CAs themselves will perform the
role of monitors on behalf of their clients. Large or-
ganizations such as Google or independent watchdogs
will act as auditors to ensure logs are generally well-
formed and updated properly.
In addition, web browsers can function as part-
time auditors, periodically checking with logs for
proof that SCTs for certificates from sites the
browser has visited were indeed logged as promised.
Every log server stores its data in a Merkle tree,
where each leaf is a hash of a log entry. This enables
the log to efficiently prove to the auditor that the
tested certificate is recorded in the log data using a
standard Merkle proof-of-inclusion. Auditors obtain
an up to date Merkle tree root, called a Signed Tree
Head (STH), via a broadcast/gossip mechanism that
we do not discuss here.
Privacy challenges with CT
While CT provides a strong defense against misis-
suance, several privacy challenges are not addressed
by the current design and may hinder wide adoption.
First, CT auditing can violate users’ browsing pri-
vacy. Recall that when an auditor, such as a web
browser, encounters a valid SCT, it should check that
the corresponding certificate is properly recorded on
the designated log server. If the certificate is missing
from the log or, more precisely, if the log server fails
to prove inclusion, the browser must then publicize
the SCT to indicate possible misbehavior by the log
server. A natural choice is to report the SCT to the
browser’s vendor (e.g., Google in the case of Chrome).
The vendor will need to investigate the log and po-
tentially remove the misbehaving log server from the
browser’s list of trusted logs.
We note that this inclusion check by the auditor is
primarily needed for certificates that are not publicly
accessible. For public certificates, large auditors like
Google can check certificate inclusion in the log by
themselves.
The problem with this approach is that it vio-
lates user privacy: the browser must send the offend-
ing SCT to the verifier, thereby revealing the user’s
browsing behavior to the verifier. This is especially
troubling considering that this auditing mechanism
is primarily applied to non-public sites that the user
visits. Ideally, we should enable log server auditing
without violating user privacy. Although, in prin-
ciple, Tor could be used in this situation, we seek a
solution that does not rely on external infrastructure.
There are also situations where it is important to hide
the certificate that has been excluded independent of
whether the identity of the reporter is known.
The second difficulty with CT is that it is currently
incompatible with private subdomains. Consider an
enterprise that does not want to reveal the domains
of its internal servers to the public. However, the en-
terprise wishes to use a public CA to issue certificates
for its internal subdomains (or to log its privately is-
sued certificates in a public log). Because domain
names are publicly available in the CT log, logging
certificates will reveal the servers’ private domains.
Certificates issued from private CAs (root CAs not
trusted by default but manually added to browsers)
are exempt from CT as a workaround to this pri-
vacy problem. That is, browsers forgo the SCT re-
quirement for certificate chains ending in a manually-
installed root (a necessity to enable enterprise data
loss prevention tools to inspect HTTPS traffic).
However, this is unsatisfactory for two reasons.
First, installing a private root on all browsers is a
major configuration burden. More importantly, ad-
ministering an internal CA introduces a significant
security risk—if the internal CA is compromised then
all client traffic may be eavesdropped. Organizations
may wisely wish to forgo this risk and rely on an
external CA.
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1.1 Our Contributions
We develop practical solutions to both challenges dis-
cussed above which can be implemented efficiently on
top of the existing CT specification [31].
Privacy-preserving proofs of misbehavior
We develop an efficient zero-knowledge protocol that
enables an auditor, such as a web browser, to prove
to its vendor (say, Google) that it has a valid SCT,
properly signed by the log server, and yet the log
omits the corresponding certificate. Specifically, the
auditor proves in zero-knowledge that it has a valid
SCT, as well as a valid proof of non-inclusion in the
log’s Merkle tree. This proves log misbehvaior. The
vendor learns nothing, other than the fact that log
integrity has failed.
The zero-knowledge proof is about 330 KB and
takes approximately five seconds to generate and
three seconds to verify. This overhead is tolerable,
given that this mechanism is used infrequently. We
also consider a variant that provides weaker privacy
guarantees, but effectively revokes the missing cer-
tificate without revealing it to the verifier. Our con-
struction is presented in Section 2, where we discuss
several practical considerations in its application.
CT for private subdomains
We give a complete solution that makes CT fully
compatible with private subdomains. Our construc-
tion makes it possible for enterprises to use a pub-
lic CA that issues standard SCTs without revealing
any information about the names of internal domains.
Our construction, presented in Section 3, uses only
commitments and has very low overhead.
Short-lived certificates
We also consider the implications of using CT in con-
junction with short-lived certificates, which are cer-
tificates that are valid for only one day [48]. The two
ideas, CT and short-lived certificates, seem incom-
patible: the large number of short-lived certificates
would overwhelm the log servers. In Section 4 we
provide a simple solution, using Merkle trees, that
resolves this tension.
2 Zero Knowledge Proof of Ex-
clusion
We start by showing how to audit CT logs with-
out violating user privacy. Specifically, we show
how a web browser can construct an efficient zero-
knowledge proof that a log server has issued a valid
SCT but that the corresponding certificate has not
been entered into its Certificate Transparency (CT)
log. This proves that log integrity has failed without
revealing any information about the user’s browsing
behavior.
Throughout the section we use the following ter-
minology:
• Log: The entity managing a CT log and issuing
SCTs that must be inserted into the log.
• Prover: An auditor, such as a web browser, that
obtained a certificate and a SCT by visiting a
site, but the certificate data is missing from the
designated log.
• Verifier: An authority that wants to learn
that a log is misbehaving without learning the
prover’s browsing behavior. That is, without
learning the offending SCT. This authority has
the power to investigate the log to determine
what went wrong, and to potentially take steps
to revoke the log.
More precisely, a log entry is a tuple (data, I, T ),
where I and T are 64-bit integers representing the
index of the entry among the leaves of the Merkle
tree and its timestamp respectively. data represents
the rest of the contents of the log entry (e.g. an
X509 certificate). Recall that log entries make up the
leaves of a Merkle tree, sorted by their timestamp T .
An SCT is the pair (data, T ), where data contains
the log’s signature on the domain name and other
certificate data. When x represents a log entry or
an SCT, we use Tx to refer to the timestamp of that
entry and Ix to refer to that entry’s index in the leaves
of the log’s Merkle tree.
In our system, the prover proves that it holds an
SCT y whose timestamp Ty falls between the times-
tamps of two adjacent log entries x and z in the
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Merkle tree. This proves that the entry y is miss-
ing from the log because it would otherwise appear
between x and z. The proof should reveal nothing to
the verifier beyond the fact that some SCT is missing
from the log.
2.1 Privacy Goals and Limitations
We begin by discussing the threat model, and the
level of privacy to be expected from a solution.
Recall that the prover wishes to prove to a ver-
ifier that it holds an SCT y whose timestamp falls
between two neighboring log entries x and z without
revealing x, y, or z. While it is clear why revealing
the missing SCT y would reveal information about
the prover’s web browsing, it may not immediately
be obvious why x and z should also be hidden. The
reason is that knowledge of the timestamps of x and
z would allow the verifier to learn what users have
visited some particular suspected site. The verifier
simply visits that site and checks if its SCT times-
tamp does indeed fall between the x and z reported
by the prover. We emphasize that it is important
not only to prevent leaking information about the
prover’s browsing habits but also to avoid giving the
verifier information it could use on its own to uncover
the sites visited by the prover.
Suppose that a log only records SCTs for publicly
accessible domains, and that only a single SCT is
missing from the log, say belonging to domain D.
Once the prover sends the verifier its zero-knowledge
proof that the log is missing some SCT, the verifier
could do an exhaustive search of all public SCTs and
learn that the SCT for domain D has been excluded.
This reveals to the verifier that the prover visited
domain D. This privacy limitation is inherent to CT.
Our approach is primarily used to preserve privacy
when a prover (web browser) audits a private domain
that is not publicly accessible. It also provides pri-
vacy in case the log drops many SCTs from its log
data.
An alternative way to protect the privacy of the
prover’s web behavior is to have the prover submit
its accusation to the verifier over Tor. Our solution
avoids relying on external infrastructure like Tor, and
does not rely on non-collusion assumptions that Tor
requires. Moreover, there are situations where it is
important not only to hide the identity of the reporter
but also the identity of the site being visited. Con-
sider for example if the excluded SCT corresponds to
a private domain. Sending the missing certificate to
a verifier, even if it could be done without revealing
the identity of the reporter, still reveals the private
domain to the verifier. This means that private re-
porting of exclusions is important not only to protect
the web history of a user but also to protect private
domains on CT logs.
Recall that there is a period of time, the maximum
merge delay (MMD), after an SCT is issued and be-
fore it is required to be present in the log. One con-
cern is that this may cause “false positives” where
a certificate with a valid SCT can be shown to be
excluded from the log before the MMD period has
elapsed. As we will see, this does not affect our solu-
tion because the prover must present a log entry that
has been added after the MMD has elapsed.
Actionable evidence
Our zero-knowledge proof hides, by design, all in-
formation about the log’s infraction, except the fact
that some SCT is missing. This may make a subse-
quent investigation of the log server more challenging.
Once a log has been shown to have excluded SCTs,
it must launch an internal investigation to determine
the source of the problem and satisfy investigators
that its practices are adequate. At the very least,
the log can conclude that it has been compromised
and make sure to change its signing keys for future
operation.
In Section 2.6 we present an alternate approach
that, in addition to proving log-exclusion, lets other
browsers treat the missing certificate as invalid. This
effectively revokes the offending certificate while re-
vealing nothing to the verifier.
2.2 Preliminaries
Our construction requires the following additional
components in the CT protocol:
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Additional signatures: Each log entry x is accom-
panied by signed messages
SignkH (H(x)), SignkT (Tx+H(x)), SignkI (Ix+H(x)),
where kH , kT , and kI are different signing keys.
Each SCT y is accompanied only by one signed
message SignkT (Tx +H(x)). In total, this requires 4
additional signed messages to be distributed by the
log for each certificate: 1 signature in each SCT and
3 signatures in each log entry.
Ordered log entries: Monitors must make sure
that the ordering of index numbers corresponds to
the order of timestamps in log entries. That is,
logs must ensure that if Ix > Iy, then it must hold
that Tx > Ty. This ensures that the logs fulfill our
definition of being well-formed and contrasts with
the current setting where indexes can be assigned to
queued entries in any order in a sequencing phase
after SCTs are distributed.
We also need the following specialized primitives:
Commitments: We need a commitment scheme
that is additively homomorphic and supports effi-
cient zero-knowledge equality tests and range proofs.
We informally define a commitment with binding and
hiding properties as follows:
– Binding: Given a commitment Cm to message
m, it is computationally hard to decommit it to
any message m′ 6= m.
– Hiding: It is computationally hard to determine
the message m given only commitment Cm.
An additively homomorphic commitment scheme
is one which allows for addition of two values while
both are under commitments. Equality tests check
whether the values of two commitments are equal,
and range proofs prove that the value of a commit-
ment falls within some range (or in our case checks
that the value is greater than zero). Many practical
schemes and protocols with these properties exist
[39, 18, 11, 6, 17, 14, 44, 7, 13, 8].
Signatures: We also require a signature scheme with
efficient proofs of knowledge of a signature:
Definition 1 (Proof of Knowledge of a Signature).
A Proof of Knowledge of a signature is a zero knowl-
edge proof that (pk′, c′1, c
′
2) ∈ P , where P is defined
as the language of triples (pk, c1, c2) where c1 and c2
are commitments to m and Signpk(m), respectively,
for some message m. Moreover, there exists an ex-
tractor E that, given black box access to the prover,
can extract the message m and signature Signpk(m).
The following signature schemes have efficient
proofs of knowledge of a signature:
• CL02 [9] signatures, based on RSA
• BBS [5] signatures, based on pairings, can be
easily modified, as described Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya [10], to provide efficient proofs of
knowledge of signatures
• CL04 [10] signatures, also based on pairings
Hash function: Finally, we will use a near collision
resistant hash function, defined as follows:
Definition 2 (δ-near collision resistant hash func-
tion). A hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zn is δ-near
collision resistant if it is hard to find x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗
such that |H(x)−H(y)| < δ.
Specifically we will assume H : {0, 1}∗ → Z2λ is a
poly(λ)-near collision resistant hash function, where
λ is a security parameter and poly(λ) denotes some
polynomial function of λ.
Although a stronger assumption than collision-
resistance, it appears that most hash functions con-
jectured to be collision-resistant also satisfy poly(n)-
near collision resistance. IfH is modeled as a random
oracle, then H has poly(n)-collision resistance since
the probability that two random points in {0, 1}n fall
within poly(n) of each other is poly(n)2n .
2.3 Construction
Protocol Π is between a prover and a verifier with
capabilities to somehow punish a misbehaving log.
The zero knowledge proof is in two parts. In the first
5
part (summarized in figure 1), the verifier receives
commitments CTx , CIx , CTy , CTz , and CIz to the in-
dexes I and timestamps T of log entries x, z and to
the timestamp of the SCT y. The verifier receives
additional commitments described below, including
a commitment to H(x). The second part proves that
the indexes Ix and Iz are adjacent and that the times-
tamps are ordered such that Tx < Ty < Tz.
The first part uses the signed messages accompa-
nying a log entry to both verify that the commit-
ments given by the prover are legitimate and to prove
that each (index, timestamp) pair corresponds to the
same log entry. Using the additive homomorphic
properties of the commitment, both Ix and Tx are
added to H(x), giving commitments to Ix+H(x) and
Tx+H(x). The prover then proves in zero knowledge
that the values in these commitments are properly
signed by the log.
To complete the actual proof of omission, the
prover sends and reveals a commitment C1 to the
number 1 and proves in zero knowledge that CIx+1
and CIz are commitments to the same value. Next,
the verifier computes commitments Cp1 = CTz−Ty
and Cp2 = CTy−Tx . Finally the prover proves in zero
knowledge that p1 > 0 and p2 > 0.
The complete protocol Π is as follows:
1. Prover sends commitments CSignkI (Ix+H(x))
,
CSignkH (H(x))
, CSignkT (Tx+H(x))
,
CSignkT (Ty+H(y))
, CSignkI (Iz+H(z))
,
CSignkH (H(z))
, CSignkT (Tz+H(z))
, CTx , CH(x),
CIx , CH(y), CTy , CTz , CH(z), CIz , C1, and rC1 .
2. Verifier computes CIx+H(x), CTx+H(x),
CTy+H(y), CIz+H(z), and CTz+H(z)
3. Prover proves in zero knowledge that each com-
mitment to a signature in step 1 corresponds to
the correct value, as shown in figure 1. That is,
the prover verifies a signature under a commit-
ment for each edge labeled “verify” in figure 1.
Here we are using three zero-knowledege proofs
for the language (pk′, c′1, c
′
2) where c
′
2 is a com-
mitment to a valid signature under pk′ for a mes-
sage committed to by c′1.
CSignkH (H(x))
CH(x) CTx+H(x)
CTx
CSignkT (Tx+H(x))
CIx+H(x)
CIx
CSignkI (Ix+H(x))
sum
verify verify
sum
sum
verify
sum
Figure 1: The process of getting verified commit-
ments to the Index and Timestamp of a log entry.
SCTs only require one signature because there is no
need to ensure a connection with an Index for SCTs
(which have no Index).
4. Verifier computes CIx+1, Cp1 = CTz−Ty , and
Cp2 = CTy−Tx .
5. Prover proves in zero knowledge that Ix+1 = Iz ,
p1 > 0, and p2 > 0.
Complexity
The overhead of our scheme does not increase as the
size of the log grows, meaning we achieve O(1) proof
construction and verification time in the size of the
log. This optimal asymptotic overhead is enabled by
the strict ordering of log entries by timestamp en-
forced by monitors. Imposing such a locally check-
able condition on the structure of the log removes the
need for any computation that would involve more
than one SCT and two log entries in either the con-
struction of a proof or its verification. Our construc-
tion also enjoys reasonable overhead in practice, as
discussed in section 2.8.
2.4 Security Analysis
We now prove the security of the construction in the
previous section. Appendix A gives a formal defini-
tion of a CT log with the modifications we require for
our scheme to work, a security definition that cap-
tures our goals, and a full proof of security. Infor-
mally, we require the following properties of a Zero-
Knowledge Exclusion Proof:
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• Completeness: Any prover who really does
have an SCT that has been excluded from a log
will be able to convince a verifier of this fact.
• Soundness: No fraudulent prover can convince
a verifier that a log has excluded an SCT. We
define this in terms of a security game ProofExcl
between a verifier V and an adversary A who
wishes to run protocol Π to prove that honest
log L has excluded an entry. We require that no
adversary A can win this game (and therefore
convince V to accept a fraudulent proof) with
more than negligible probability.
• Zero-Knowledge: A verifier learns nothing
from the proof except that a log entry has been
excluded. We achieve this by exhibiting a simu-
lator for the verifier’s view of the protocol.
The proof of security is given in Appendix A. Here
we sketch the main idea. The proofs for complete-
ness and zero knowledge follow from the properties
of the underlying components of the protocol. Prov-
ing soundess requires more work. The idea is that the
adversary is forced by the security of the signatures to
use only index and timestamp values that appear in
the log. We need to show that the log cannot contain
signed sums s1 = Ix+H(x) and s2 = Iz +H(z), and
signed hashes H(x′) and H(z′) such that s1 −H(x
′)
is one less than s2 − H(z
′). Otherwise, the adver-
sary would obtain a fake pair of index numbers that
are one apart and that can therefore fool the veri-
fier (a similar statement should also hold for times-
tamps). Finding such entries would, however, break
the poly(λ)-near collision resistance of the hash func-
tion, as shown in Appendix A.
2.5 Alternative Construction
The zero-knowledge proof in the previous section can
be modified so that it only relies collision resistant
hash functions, not δ-near collision resistance. How-
ever, this proof is slightly less efficient.
The modified proof Π′ is similar to Π, except
that instead of having signatures on Ix +H
′(x) and
Tx+H
′(x), the log publishes signatures on Ix‖H
′(x)
and Tx‖H
′(x), where ‖ denotes concatenation. Be-
fore adding Tx or Ix to H
′(x), the verifier multiplies
each by a commitment to 2n, effectively left-shifting
Tx and Ix so the sum with H
′(x) can be interpreted
as a concatenation of the two values. This simplifies
the soundness proof so that the value of d will always
be 0, and any adversary A′ winning the modified se-
curity game could be used by another adversary B′
to find a collision for H ′. The proof that Π′ is a zero-
knowledge proof is otherwise very similar to that of
Π. Although the soundness of Π′ relies on a weaker
assumption than Π, it requires the prover to send
an additional commitment to the verifier and for the
prover and verifier to compute two interactive mul-
tiplications on commitments [11], rendering Π′ less
efficient than Π.
2.6 Actionable Proof of Exclusion
Although we presented a solution with best-possible
privacy, in some contexts it is desirable to reveal some
more information to help with deployment of the sys-
tem. In particular, we are interested in the case
where the verifier needs some recourse other than
completely distrusting a log after learning that the
log has cheated. In our current system, a verifier has
no power, for example, to issue a whitelist or blacklist
of trusted/untrusted certificates for a particular log
because it learns nothing about excluded SCTs other
than that they exist.
We can do much better if we are willing to com-
promise on the degree of privacy offered to provers.
Since it is likely that any SCT excluded from the
log but publicly accessible on the internet will be
caught by an auditor (e.g. Google) without need for
a proof, we must mainly concern ourselves with SCTs
for certificates that are not publicly accessible. We
want a scheme where the verifier does not learn the
certificate corresponding to a bad SCT but enables
browsers to reject that certificate if they encounter it.
In other words, we wish to enable browsers to recog-
nize when an SCT they encounter has been excluded
from a log without revealing the contents of the SCT
to a verifier.
We achieve this by relaxing our privacy goals.
Whereas our original proof was of a statement of the
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form “There exists a properly signed SCT y whose
timestamp falls between adjacent log entries x and
z,” we now wish to prove that “There exists a prop-
erly signed SCT y whose timestamp falls between ad-
jacent log entries x and z, and c = H(y) is the hash of
y,” where c is supplied by the prover. By construct-
ing a proof that intentionally reveals H(y), we make
it possible for an auditor who encounters an SCT y′
to check if H(y′) = H(y). At the same time, the
high entropy of H(y) ensures that y remains hidden.
This weakened proof is of course only useful if the
SCT y in question is not in the set of publicly avail-
able SCTs or else the verifier could test H(y) against
hashes of each available SCT and discover y by ex-
haustive search. Fortunately, the scenario where a
non-public SCT is omitted from the log is exactly
the scenario we aim to address.
We need only to make a slight modification to our
zero knowledge protocol in order to achieve this weak-
ened notion of privacy. Suppose we choose to instan-
tiate our protocol with Pedersen commitments [39],
which provide all the properties we require in a com-
mitment scheme. Pedersen commitments are of the
form Cm = g
mhr for public g, h and secret random-
ness r. We can set r = 0 in our commitment to H(y)
and maintain the binding property of the commit-
ment due to the high entropy of H(y), as mentioned
above (and have the verifier compute the commit-
ment gH(y) upon receiving H(y)). The rest of the
proof proceeds as before. Now the verifier can dis-
tribute H(y), and any browser can check if an SCT
it has acquired matches the one used to construct the
proof.
2.7 Practical Considerations
The presented solution can be implemented on top of
the existing Certificate Transparency specification,
RFC6962, with some adjustments.
Key distribution: The existing mechanism for
distributing the log’s key for verifying SCTs signed
using kS can be used for distributing the additional
keys for verifying signatures produced using kH , kT ,
and kI .
Obtaining entries around a timestamp: The
current CT RFC only specifies an API for get-
ting the index of an entry in the log given its
hash, requiring the client to know the times-
tamp and the certificate for that entry. A new
API endpoint is needed to provide a number
of log entries around a timestamp specified by
the client:/ct/v1/get-entries-around-timestamp
with the following inputs:
• timestamp: The desired timestamp, in decimal.
• count: The desired number of entries.
and the following output for each entry:
• index: Index of the entry.
• sct: JSON structure containing the SCT, as de-
scribed in Section 4.1 of RFC6962.
• signatures: JSON structure contain-
ing SignkH (H(e)), SignkI (i + H(e)) and
SignkT (t + H(e)) (H(e), i + H(e) and t + H(e)
can be calculated by the client).
This additional API endpoint may be independently
useful for monitors searching for fraudulent certifi-
cates suspected to be issued around the time of some
particular event, e.g. a security breach.
Adding signatures to SCTs: Signed Certificate
Timestamps have an extensions field which can be
used for embedding the signatures σTy+H(y), σH(y).
As the signature in the Signed Certificate Timestamp
covers the extensions field, these signatures should
be produced before the signature over the entire
Signed Certificate Timestamp, SignkS (s).
Uniqueness of timestamps: Timestamps are
required to be unique under this construction.
Distributed implementation of a log could issue two
SCTs with exactly the same timestamp for two
different entries submitted at the same time. To
avoid restricting the implementation, each front-end
of the log will be assigned a unique ID, which will
be concatenated to the timestamp to ensure unique-
ness. In practice, the unique ID should be added
as an extension to the SCT to avoid changing the
timestamp format currently specified in the CT RFC.
Denial of Service: The need for the verifier to
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check several signatures and zero knowledge proofs
introduces the potential for a denial of service attack
launched by sending many fake proofs that will
fail to verify but will occupy verifier time, thereby
preventing proper functioning of this kind of proof
of exclusion. Although concern regarding denial of
service potential is legitimate, it is not as bad as it
may first seem. The verifier can abort verification of
a bad proof early in less than 1/7 of the verification
time for a correct proof when either a signature
verification fails or the submitted commitments do
not satisfy the relations needed for the proof to go
through.
Uncooperative logs: Logs have an incentive to not
respond to queries by auditors who are building a
proof of exclusion. Suppose a log does not respond
to timestamp-based queries. An auditor can instead
use index-based queries (also used by monitors) and
perform a binary search to find the entry with the
relevant timestamp needed for constructing the proof.
A malicious log could go further. Suppose it places
a “dummy” entry on each side of the missing entry
and refuses to respond to requests for those dummy
entries. This prevents the auditor from constructing
the proof. However, this tactic will be unsuccessful
because monitors will discover this misbehavior when
they attempt retrieve all log entries as part of their
normal periodic sweep. For this we need that a re-
quest to a CT log from a monitor is indistinguishable
from a request from an auditor. This is needed to de-
feat uncooperative logs, and is also needed for correct
operation of log monitoring.
2.8 Performance Evaluation
We built a prototype of our protocol in parts using
ZKPDL [35] for the purpose of estimating the per-
formance of such a scheme and ran it on a consumer
laptop equipped with an Intel Core i5-2540M Sandy
Bridge Processor at 2.60GHz. Our implementation
consisted of the entire protocol except the verifica-
tion of the signatures, for which a ZKPDL implemen-
tation already exists for the RSA-based CL02 signa-
ture scheme of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [9]. Us-
ing 2048-bit RSA keys, we measured the proof size,
prover computation time, and verifier computation
time for our implementation as well as the signature
verification (which we multiply by 7 to account for
the 7 verifications needed in the proof). The num-
bers shown in figure 2 are averages over 20 executions.
Although the protocol may seem costly, we point out
that it is meant to be executed infrequently to catch
cheating logs and is not expected to be part of reg-
ular, day-to-day web browsing activities. As such,
the cost of under 10 seconds and 350 KB on the net-
work seems reasonable. It is important to note that
the 333 KB proof is not something that will be in-
cluded in SCTs or logs but data that is generated
when the proof is needed. The overhead for instan-
tiating our scheme with CL02 and BBS signatures is
shown in figure 3 in terms of growth of SCTs and
log entries. These numbers, especially those for BBS
signatures, are very reasonable when it is considered
that the SCTs will typically be delivered along with
certificate chains that are already sometimes several
kilobytes large.
3 Private Subdomains in CT
We next turn to the second privacy difficulty dis-
cussed in the introduction: extending CT to handle
private subdomains, such as the internal subdomains
of an enterprise network. Recall that CT requires
every SCT and log entry to reveal the domain name
for which the associated certificate is issued. This
prevents companies who have private internal subdo-
mains from using a public CA, an undesirable conse-
quence of CT.
A great deal of discussion has taken place around
this issue in the CT forum [46, 1]. The main pro-
posed solutions involve redaction of names via wild-
cards or inclusion of a domain name hash instead of a
cleartext name. Wildcards in log entries pose a secu-
rity risk and can only be used to redact the leftmost
label of a domain name. Hashed domain names, on
the other hand, are vulnerable to a dictionary attack.
Since domain names tend to have very little entropy,
a dictionary attack is a significant threat to a solution
that relies on hashing. For these reasons, the current
draft RFC for CT version 2.0 has no solution for this
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Component Proof Size (bytes) Prover Time (ms) Verifier Time (ms)
Signature Verification (7x) 316888 4986.8 2274.0
Rest of Proof 16328 30.6 36.2
Total 333216 5017.4 2310.2
Figure 2: Running times and proof size for our zero knowledge proof of exclusion using the signatures of [9].
Signature CL02[9] BBS[5]
Log Entry Growth (bytes) 1791 480
SCT Growth (bytes) 597 160
Figure 3: Expected growth in log entry and SCT
size due to inclusion of signatures required for our
zero knowledge proof of exclusion protocol when us-
ing RSA-based CL02 signatures or pairing-based BBS
signatures. Log entries require including 3 signatures,
and SCTs require 1.
problem [32].
In this section, we will consider the various require-
ments of a solution to this problem and establish a
clear threat model before providing a solution which
protects against all the threats we enumerate.
3.1 Threat Model
Figure 4 depicts interactions between all parties in-
volved in the issuance and use of a certificate in CT.
The domain owner requests a certificate from a CA
who sends a precertificate to a log, which in turn
sends the CA an SCT that is passed on, along with a
certificate, to the domain owner. Later, a site visitor
or auditor visits the site for which the certificate was
issued and receives the certificate and the SCT. We
will modify the information sent in each message in
order to hide private subdomains.
We state the security requirements from the stand-
point of four parties involved in this scheme:
– Outsider: An outsider viewing the log with-
out having visited a private subdomain can-
not learn anything about the private subdo-
main except its suffix. For example, the SCT
for private.company.com should reveal nothing
beyond the fact that it belongs to a subdomain
Domain Owner D CA Log Operator
Request Certificate
Precertificate
SCT
Certificate, SCT
Domain Owner D Site Visitor
Request Site
Certificate, SCT
Figure 4: A high-level view of interactions between
parties involved generating and retrieving certificates
in CT. We will modify the messages sent in each mes-
sage to hide private subdomains.
of company.com.
– Domain Owner: The domain owner must not
be able to frame an honest log by claiming that it
has an SCT for a certificate that does not appear
on the log.
– CA: The CA must not be able to issue a new,
valid certificate using an SCT for another do-
main that already appears in a log.
– Log: Logs have the same requirements as in CT
without private domains. Auditors and moni-
tors should be able to verify that SCTs they en-
10
counter appear in logs, and monitors should be
able to examine the log and find any fraudulent
certificates therein.
3.2 Private Subdomains
These requirements can be met with a scheme that
uses only cryptographic commitments that guaran-
tee binding and hiding properties. In this scheme,
the name of a domain owner and a commitment to
a subdomain appear in CT logs instead of the sub-
domain itself. The decommitment to the subdomain
acts as a proof that the site gives to visitors, allowing
them to verify that the SCT belongs to their domain
and that it appears in a log.
The construction is as follows (summarized in
figure 5): The domain owner D generates a commit-
ment Cd to subdomain d (e.g. for the domain name
secret.example.com, we have D =example.com
and d =secret) with decommitment randomness
r. The domain owner sends (d,D,Cd, r) to the CA.
The CA checks that Cd is computed correctly and
passes (D,Cd) to the log in the signed precertificate.
The log incorporates (D,Cd) into the log entry and
SCT and sends the SCT back to the CA who passes
it on to the domain owner as usual. d and r are
embedded into the final certificate issued by the CA.
Now any visitor to the site (or any auditor/monitor)
is given the certificate and the SCT. The visitor
verifies that the commitment Cd in the SCT is in fact
a commitment to d with decommitment randomness
r. Monitors who audit the logs can check that
the correct number of example.com certificates are
present on the logs and that no spurious certificates
have been issued.
3.3 Security
We now argue that this scheme achieves security in
the threat model discussed above. Below we outline
how each of the security requirements imposed by
private subdomains are met.
Outsider: Due to the hiding property of the
commitment, an outsider observing log entries does
not learn the subdomain corresponding to Cd from
the log.
Domain Owner: Domain owners cannot frame an
honest log because every SCT from that log is signed
by the log.
CA: The binding property of the commitment
scheme prevents a CA from issuing fraudulent
certificates that reuse existing SCTs because doing
so would require finding, for a commitment Cd to a
subdomain d, an alternative decommitment to d′ for
which the fraudulent certificate would be issued.
Log: The means CT provides for auditing and ex-
posing misbehaving logs are not affected by private
subdomains. We point out that, as mentioned above,
any auditor or monitor given access to d and r can
verify an SCT just as well as it could an SCT for a
non-private domain. Moreover, a monitor working on
behalf of a domain owner will still be able to detect
fraudulent certificates issued for the domain owner’s
private subdomains if it is informed of the number of
private subdomains the domain owner has registered.
If the number of such subdomains appearing in logs
differs from the expected number, then it is clear that
either there are extra, fraudulent certificates or that
the log has withheld certificates for which it issued
SCTs.
3.4 Practical Considerations
The SCT from the log, along with d and r, can be
embedded in the final certificate issued by the CA.
A browser visiting the site would first validate the
certificate and the signature on the SCT. It would
then extract r and d from the certificate and use them
to verify the commitment Cd in the SCT.
4 Short-Lived Certificates in
CT
We also consider the interaction of Certificate Trans-
parency with another proposed improvement to the
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Domain Owner D
C = commit(“secret”, r)
CA Log Operator
log(C, example.com)
Request Certificate
“secret”, “example.com”, C, r
Precertificate
C, “example.com”
SCT
C, “example.com”
Certificate:
“secret.example.com”, r
SCT:
C, “example.com”
Domain Owner D Site Visitor
verify(C, secret, r)
Page Request:
“secret.example.com”
Certificate:
“secret.example.com”, r
SCT:
C, “example.com”
Figure 5: CT augmented with support for private subdomains. C represents a commitment to the private
subdomain “secret” with decommitment randomness r. The SCT and log entry for “secret.example.com”
replace the private subdomain with C, and visitors to the site verify that the commitment corresponds to
the appropriate subdomain.
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web’s public-key infrastructure: short-lived certifi-
cates [42]. The fundamental idea behind short-lived
certificates is to issue certificates with relatively short
validity periods (i.e. one or a few days) in order to re-
move the need on the part of a client to check whether
or not a certificate received remains valid. Instead of
revoking a certificate, the domain owner in the short-
lived certificate setting simply refrains from issuing a
new short-lived certificate in the event of key com-
promise. Topalovic et al. [48] explore the details of
this idea and compare it favorably to other proposed
and implemented solutions for certificate revocation.
Considering the possibility of applying short-lived
certificates in conjunction with certificate trans-
parency presents the new difficulty of avoiding
bloated log sizes. The frequency with which new cer-
tificates would need to be issued under the short-lived
certificate regime would mean that where one log en-
try would suffice for a regular certificate, nearly 100
short-lived certificates would be needed. A naive in-
tegration of the two solutions would lead to log sizes
far larger than is truly necessary, but a simple solu-
tion can remedy this issue and allow the two solutions
to work together quite well.
Instead of creating one log entry per certificate for
short-lived certificates, a large number of potential
short-lived certificates will be allotted one log entry.
This log entry will have a special flag set to indicate
that it corresponds to a family of short-lived certifi-
cates, and the validity period for the log entry will
be comparable to that of a regular, long-lived cer-
tificate. The special log entry will also include the
root of a Merkle tree of all the short-lived certificates
affiliated with the entry. When visiting a site that
uses short-lived certificates, auditors will receive a
proof that the SCT for that site’s certificate is in the
Merkle tree whose root appears in the corresponding
log entry. This is the best-of-both-worlds: the growth
rate of the CT log is no different from that due to a
regular certificate, but the short-lived nature of the
individual certificates also resolves revocation issues.
5 Related Work
Well-documented concerns about the state of the
web’s public-key infrastructure (PKI) [16] have led to
a number of proposed solutions for improving the ca-
pacity to catch problematic CAs or to dispense with
CAs altogether. Pinning solutions such as Tack [34]
improve security by adding a “pinned” signing key
that is associated with a server and without which
the server will not be considered authentic. In addi-
tion to CT, a handful of other proposed PKI improve-
ments rely on the concept of transparent logs. The
EFF’s Sovereign Keys proposal uses a log to list the
Sovereign Keys associated with domains and allows
for automatically routing around certain certficate-
related attacks where users tend to click through
browser warnings [24]. AKI and ARPKI implement a
set of checks and balances to prevent problems rooted
in the misbehavior of one or a few CAs, and ARPKI
is co-designed with a formal model to prove its secu-
rity properties [28, 4]. Namecoin uses a blockchain to
achieve goals similar to those of other improved PKI
schemes [38]. Taking a somewhat different approach,
Etemad and Kupcu [21] propose a scheme where non-
colluding servers gossip to catch any cheating parties.
Certificate Transparency has received heightened
academic attention as it begins to be widely de-
ployed in Chrome and Chromium browsers. Multi-
ple works have analyzed the security of Certificate
Transparency and its generalizations or designed ef-
ficient protocols for parts of the scheme that are not
specified in the current RFC. Chuat et al. [15] pro-
vide efficient gossip protocols to ensure that different
users of CT do in fact have the same view of the logs
with which they interact, and Dowling et al. [19]
formally prove the security of many aspects of Cer-
tificate transparency. In the space of extensions and
modifications to CT, Singh et al [45] propose a vari-
ant of CT with extended functionality and shorter
log proofs and Syta et al [47] propose CoSi, a “wit-
ness cosigning” protocol that removes the need for
gossip in CT by ensuring that every certificate is val-
idated by many witnesses, offering protection even
against sustained man in the middle attacks. Chase
and Meiklejohn [12] prove the security of a general-
ization of Certificate Transparency they call “Trans-
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parency Overlays,” which can be added on top of
other protocols such as Bitcoin to add a layer of trans-
parency. They leave the exploration of the interaction
between transparency and privacy as an interesting
open problem, one which our work begins to study.
The notion of transparency itself has been studied
in various settings not necessarily related to the web’s
PKI and appears to be a fairly general notion. Revo-
cation Transparency provides a transparency-based
solution for certificate revocation [30]. DECIM [52]
uses a transparency log to keep track of uses of a pub-
lic key in a messaging context, thereby enabling its
owner to detect key misuse. Fahl et al. [23] improve
the security of mobile app distribution with “Appli-
cation Transparency.” Extended Certificate Trans-
parency [43] adds a second log to efficiently handle
certificate revocation and presents an application to
secure email. Finally, a number of works have focused
on building general transparent data structures and
enabling computation over them [40, 41, 37, 49].
At least two systems have combined transparency
with privacy notions. CONIKS [36] provides a trans-
parent identity/value map (with key management for
secure communication as a motivating application)
while hiding identifiers and values. NSEC5 [25] is
an extension to DNSSEC providing stronger privacy
by hiding the set of valid subdomains for any given
domain. Both use VRFs as a key building block for
preserving privacy.
6 Availability
The simulation code for the second
part of our zero knowledge proof of ex-
clusion can be found on GitHub at
https://github.com/SabaEskandarian/CTZKPExcl.
The code used to interpret and run the simulation,
along with the implementation of the signature
scheme is part of the ZKPDL project [35] at
https://github.com/brownie/cashlib.
7 Conclusion and Open Ques-
tions
We have examined various elements of Certificate
Transparency with the goal of applying cryptographic
solutions to remedy the compromise of private infor-
mation without significantly disrupting the operation
of CT as it is currently designed. Our primary goals
were to develop a privacy-preserving means of expos-
ing logs that have excluded certificates after issuing
SCTs for them and to securely redact private subdo-
mains in CT logs. We accomplished the former goal
by developing a zero knowledge proof that achieves
the best possible security for privately implicating a
cheating log. The latter problem was solved by the re-
alization that commitment schemes appropriately ap-
plied exactly match the security properties required
for private subdomains. We also showed how CT
and short-lived certificates can be used in concert. It
is our hope that these practical solutions based on
widely-used cryptographic primitives can be applied
to promote a more transparent web without any com-
promise in user privacy.
We leave the following open questions for future
work:
• Are there improved, practical schemes for
browsers to privately query CT logs? We con-
sidered some partial solutions in section 2.7, but
a complete solution to this problem would be
very useful. One possibility is to use a mecha-
nism similar to OCSP stapling, where the proof
of SCT inclusion in the log is sent with a site’s
certificate, but this would require more band-
width and frequent updates to the proof to use
an up-to-date STH.
• Can the zero knowledge proof of exclusion of log
entries we present be modified to require fewer
signatures or even more lightweight primitives,
thereby reducing overhead in SCTs and log en-
tries?
• We have shown how to achieve private subdo-
mains in CT. Is it also possible to efficiently
make entire domain names private? Such a
scheme would be useful in practice for enterprises
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who wish to register domains for new projects
before announcing them publicly.
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A Security Model and Proof
Details
Below we give a formalization of the definition of a
CT log that has been modified to include our addi-
tional requirements.
Definition 3 (CT Log). A CT log is an entity
that maintains append-only lists Log, hashLog, ILog,
and TLog as well as 4 signing keys kH , kT , kI , kS
and a counter i. A CT log’s lists are ini-
tially empty, and the counter is initially set to 0.
It also has access to poly(λ)-near collision resis-
tant hash function H, a signature scheme σ =
(KeyGen′, Sign′,Verify′) , and another signature
scheme σk = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) with efficient
proof of knowledge properties (as in Definition 1).
Upon receiving a message m, t from party P , a log
forms the SCT s = (m, t) and takes the following
actions1:
• send P (H(s), SignkH (H(s)))
• send P (t+H(s), SignkT (t+H(s)))
• send P the SCT s and Sign′kS (s)
• append e = (m, i, t) to Log
• append (H(e), SignkH (H(e))) to hashLog
• append (i +H(e), SignkI (i+H(e))) to ILog
• append (t+H(e), SignkT (t+H(e))) to TLog
• increment i by one
A well-formed list Log consists of poly(λ) entries
ordered by increasing order of I. Values of I must
begin at zero and be incremented by one for each sub-
sequent entry. Values of T must fall within a range
of poly(λ) where λ is a security parameter. Further-
more, the order of entries of I and T must correlate,
that is, if Ix > Iy, then it must hold that Tx > Ty.
Lists hashLog, ILog, and TLog have one entry per
entry in Log and are sorted in the same way.
A CT log also responds to requests for entries in
its lists with the requested information.
We make use of the following proof of exclusion
soundness game and security definition in proving
the security of our proposed zero knowledge exclu-
sion proof.
1Although in reality it is the log who assigns t and not P ,
defining the security model such that P selects t makes the
adversary strictly more powerful in our setting.
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Definition 4 (ProofExclΠ,A,V,L(λ)). The proof of ex-
clusion game is played by an adversary A with a log L
and Verifier V using protocol Π and security param-
eter λ. L maintains append-only lists Log (a well-
formed CT log), hashLog, ILog, and TLog, which
are initially empty. L also has the appropriate sign-
ing keys and a counter i, initialized to zero. The game
consists of two phases:
1. A interacts with L in poly(λ) rounds where in
each round A sends L a message (m, t) with the
range of all t’s sent being at most poly(λ) and
each t strictly greater than the previous one. Af-
ter each round, A retrieves from L the new entry
added to each list L holds.
2. A interacts with V according to Π, with A play-
ing the role of the prover and V the role of the
verifier. At the end of the protocol, V outputs a
bit b = 1 if it accepts the proof from A as valid,
and outputs b = 0 otherwise.
A wins the game when V outputs b = 1.
Definition 5 (Zero-Knowledge Exclusion Proof). A
zero-knowledge exclusion proof is an interactive pro-
tocol between a Prover P with access to log entries
x, z, SCT y, signatures σIx+H(x), σTx+H(x), σH(x),
σTy+H(y), σH(y), σIz+H(z), σTz+H(z), and σH(z) and
a Verifier V with access to the public keys correspond-
ing to the signatures who outputs 1 or 0 at the end
of their interaction. Both parties are given access to
a log L and a security parameter λ. We require the
following properties from a secure exclusion proof:
1. Completeness: ∀x, y, z s.t. Ix + 1 = Iz , Tx <
Ty < Tz, and σm is a signature on m for all
signatures above, V outputs 1.
2. Soundness: ∀ PPT Adversaries A,
Pr[ProofExclΠ,A,V,L(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ).
3. Zero-Knowledge: There exists an efficient
simulator S that, given only λ, can generate a
transcript indistinguishable from that of the in-
teraction between P and V .
For convenience of notation, the formal proof refers
to the lists of log entries, hashes of log entries, hashes
plus indexes, and hashes plus timestamps as Log,
hashLog, ILog, and TLog, respectively.
Theorem 6. If H is a poly(λ)-near collision resis-
tant hash function, the signature schemes σ, σk used
are existentially unforgeable, and σk allows for effi-
cient proofs of knowledge of a signature, then Π is a
secure Zero-Knowledge Exclusion Proof.
Proof. Completeness. The completeness of the
proof follows directly from the construction. Any
prover with access to an SCT y with the given
properties that has access to the log can follow
the protocol and convince a verifier that the log is
cheating.
Soundness. We prove that no adversary A can
win the security game ProofExcl with greater than
negligible probability through a series of three hy-
brids:
• hybrid 0: The security game
ProofExclΠ,A,V,L(λ).
• hybrid 1: Same as hybrid 0, except after V out-
puts b, we run the extractor for each proof of
knowledge of a signature and output 0 if any
of the extractions fail. This is indistinguishable
from hybrid 0 by the extractability property of
the proof of knowledge of a signature. Since the
proof of knowledge protocol has an efficient ex-
tractor, we will never fail to extract the signa-
tures used.
• hybrid 2: Same as hybrid 1, except after the veri-
fication of the extractions, the verifier checks the
extracted signatures and outputs 0 if any of them
are not found in the corresponding list held by L:
either Log, hashLog, ILog, or TLog. The adver-
sary’s advantage is at most negligibly changed
from hybrid 1 due to the existential unforgeabil-
ity of the signature scheme. If V could ever out-
put zero based on this additional check, we could
construct a new adversary B that breaks the ex-
istential unforgeability of the signature scheme
by running the protocol until V outputs 0 on
this check and then outputting the signature s
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that was not found in the log. Since all signa-
tures made by L are in one of the lists, s must
be a forged signature. Thus the additional check
in this hybrid will only change the output of V
from hybrid 1 with negligible probability.
Now we prove that no adversary A can win hybrid
game 2 with more than negligible probability. Note
that we only need to prove the soundness for the
first part of the protocol, as soundness for the second
part of the protocol follows from the soundness of the
various zero knowledge proofs it uses as subroutines.
That is, we need only show that no adversary A can
fake the indexes or timestamps of signed entries from
L. We show here the proof for indexes; the proof for
timestamps is almost identical.
In order for an adversary A to fraudulently win the
game, it must find log entries x′, x′′, and x∗ (or z′,
z′′, and z∗) such that it can add Ix′′ and H(x
′) to
get a value equal to Ix∗ +H(x
∗). Since a signature
on the latter value will be in ILog, this will allow A
to submit an acceptable proof that uses an index and
hash from different log entries.
More formally, any adversaryA that wins the game
must produce commitments CI′′x+H(x′), CI∗x+H(x∗),
CI′′z +H(z′), and CI∗z+H(z∗) that satisfy the following
conditions:
• Ix′′ + 1 = Iz′′
• Ix∗ +H(x
∗) = Ix′′ +H(x
′)
• Iz∗ +H(z
∗) = Iz′′ +H(z
′)
• (Ix′′ +H(x
′), SignkI (Ix′′ +H(x
′)) ∈ ILog
• (Iz′′ +H(z
′), SignkI (Iz′′ +H(z
′)) ∈ ILog
• x′ 6= x′′ OR z′ 6= z′′
We will consider the case where x′ 6= x′′. The case
for z′ 6= z′′ is identical. If the adversary succeeds,
then it must have found values Ix∗ , x
∗, Ix′′ , x
′ such
that
Ix∗ +H(x
∗) = Ix′′ +H(x
′) (1)
Define d = Ix′′ − Ix∗. Then we have that
H(x∗) = H(x′) + d (2)
But d < poly(λ) since A can only send polynomially
many messages to L to populate the log. Thus we can
define adversary B that breaks the d-near collision
resistance of H by calling A as a subroutine, using
the extractors from the zero knowledge proofs in the
second part of the protocol to retrieve the contents
of the commitments A used, and outputting x∗, x′ as
its near collision. This completes the soundess proof.
Zero-Knowledge. The zero knowledge property
is easy to establish as the sequential composition of a
series of other zero knowledge proofs. The simulator
starts by committing to a series of random values (ex-
cept the commitment/reveal to 1, which must neces-
sarily be done honestly). After the verifier computes
the appropriate sums of commitments, the simulator
sequentially executes several copies of the simulator
of “knowledge of a signature” from Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya ([9] or [10], depending on the signature
scheme used). After the remaining computations on
the commitments by the verifier, the simulator finally
runs the simulator for the proof of equality of com-
mitted values and the two range proofs.
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